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This paper constructs a macroeconomic model of North-South interaction where the
flow of narcotics from the South to the North is restricted. Their economic effects are
akin to quantitative restrictions in trade policy. Two alternative policy scenarios will be
considered. One involves reducing the supply of drugs at source, accompanied by aid.
Supply side restrictions have negative aggregate supply side effects in the producing
region, because of the monopoly rents generated from that type of control. This makes
them a second best policy, particularly if the accompanying aid is not used for poverty
alleviation and fails to expand domestic aggregate demand. Alternative, demand side
restrictions will be found to be superior.
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1 Introduction
The increase in transnational crime, particularly associated with the increased drug
trade, is widely recognised as part of the negative side of increased globalization.
According to the UNDCP (1998) estimates, the global production of opium by volume
increased by 141% between 1986-96. In the same period there was a 24% rise in coca
leaf output. There are several stages of processing before the final product sells in the
developed North. More important, is the huge value added from the primary commodity
to the final product. To give one example, the price of coca leaf was US$ 1 per
kilogram in Colombia in 1998, but the base for cocaine was US$ 800. This implies an
800-fold rise in value, even before final production and shipment. Farmgate prices of
opium and coca have risen, while the street value of heroin and cocaine in Europe and
the USA are declining. It is clear from the volume sold that there has been a sharp rise
in the demand for heroin and cocaine in the North.
Civil wars and organised crime both produce violence. The problems associated with
drug production are similar to the causes of conflict, and involve the interaction of greed
and grievance (Addison and Murshed 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 1999). Poverty
produces grievance which can lead to drug production, which results in violence and
even more grievance. Armed political groups use drug revenues to finance their wars;
alternatively simply to satisfy their greed when the political-economic reasons for war
have been assuaged (Northern Ireland). Thus, grievance can easily descend into
banditry. Similarly, drug-barons, whose motives are purely mercenary, use armed force
to further their political and economic ambitions.1
Poverty is as central to the economics of violence as greed. It produces incentives for
violent acts, and lowers the costs of fighting. Most drug producing states are low-
income developing countries belonging to the South. Many of the causes of poverty are
domestic in nature and are associated with bad policy choices as well as historically
inherited inequities in asset ownership. But there are external factors as well. These
include the effects of falling commodity prices (coffee, for example), the debt crisis and
the poverty increasing effects of macro-stabilisation policies imposed by multilateral
agencies.
The major drug producing nations are Peru, Bolivia and Colombia for coca2;
Afghanistan, Myanmar and Laos for opium. Many of these countries are characterised
by civil war as well as widespread poverty. Most of them have also experienced growth
failure. The consumer of drugs is mainly in the developed North, led by the world’s
only remaining superpower, the USA. The USA’s reach is far longer in Latin America
compared to Asia. It is in that region, especially Colombia, where the USA is following
a policy of drug eradication at the (farmgate) source of supply, accompanied by a policy
of military assistance to the government to fight the drug trade. Colombia is in the midst
1 It has to be admitted that both rebel groups and drug-barons occasionally provide services to the
adjoining population.
2 Interesting accounts of the drug industry in Bolivia and Colombia can be found in Gamarra (1999) and
Thoumi (1999) respectively.2
of a civil war. One side (FARC) uses coca related revenues to fight the government who
receive military assistance from the USA. In the words of Duncan Campbell:
-----a civil war in which one side will be funded by the US tax-payer and
the other side by the US drug-taker---
[Duncan Campbell, Guardian, 20th July 2000, page 7]
The purpose of this paper is to construct a macroeconomic model of North-South
interaction where the flow of narcotics from the South to the North is restricted.
Although the restraints are to do with law enforcement, their economic effects are akin
to quantitative restrictions in trade policy (see Murshed 1992a and 1992b on tariffs,
quotas and VERs in North-South models). Two alternative policy scenarios will be
considered. They are to do with the supply and demand side of the problem. The first
involves reducing the supply of drugs in the region of origin accompanied by aid. This
is the policy being pursued by the USA with regard to Colombia, criticised by Campbell
(2000). It will be postulated that supply side restrictions have negative aggregate supply
side effects in the producing region because of the monopoly rents generated from that
type of control. This will lead to supply side restrictions becoming a second best policy,
particularly if the accompanying aid is not used for poverty alleviation and fails to
expand domestic aggregate demand. Alternative, demand side restrictions will be found
to be superior.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 outlines aggregate supply
behaviour in the South, section 3 is concerned with the macroeconomics of supply side
controls and transfers to the South, section 4 with the macroeconomic analysis of a
tariff-type restriction on demand and finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Illicit production and aggregate supply in the South
The purpose of this section is to outline aggregate supply behaviour in the South within
a macroeconomic context. This makes us more concerned with the process of output
generation and less with sectoral demand-supply equilibrium at this stage. Output in the
criminal sector is a pure exportable for the South, consumed entirely in the North. Total
output or aggregate supply in the South (YS) can be said to be composed of production
in two sectors: legal activities (S) and criminal activities (C). This can be written as
) , ( C S f YS = . 0 , 0 2 1 < > f f (1)
The reasoning behind the above is that criminal activities detract from total output as
there are negative externalities involved; these include complicity in crime (bribery and
coercion), law enforcement, and the negative spillover effects of foreign sponsored
destruction of narcotic supply. The first two costs are akin to the directly unproductive
profit seeking activities (DUP) mentioned in Bhagwati (1982).3 It should also be borne
in mind that DUP actually reduces total output. A good example of the last point is the
US government’s DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency) sponsoring the destruction of coca
3 DUP is longhand in the lexicon of economics for corruption.3
plantations in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. Although compensation is paid, there are
bound to be negative effects from some of the processes used, such as the aerial
spraying of coca crops.
Equation 1 may be rewritten as a function of the two alternative instruments utilised to
restrict C:
0 , 0 )) , ( , ( 2 1 > < = C C v t C S f YS  (2)
Here t indicates the ad-valorem consumption tax equivalent of a quota in the North, and
v stands for the tariff or tax equivalent of the quantitative export restraint in the South. I
will refer to the former as the “tariff” and the latter as the “VER” (voluntary export
restraint). It should be noted that in actual fact both the “tariff” and the VER are
quantitative restrictions. The tariff is like a quota restriction on the demand side and the
VER a quota type restraint in the supply side. This is because we are dealing with a
contraband substance, which cannot be directly taxed, as it is illegal. But the restrictions
will both have their certainty tax equivalents, which we utilise in the model in this
paper. The crucial difference is that the tariff is a demand side restriction where the
revenues are retained in the consuming region (North); whereas the VER is a supply
side control where the monopoly rents generated are kept in the producing region
(South). Therefore, the tariff has a negative impact on domestic value-added in the C
sector, whereas the VER does not.
Consider the following mark-up pricing rule describing supply behaviour in the C
sector:
) 1 ( x aW P C + = (3)
where PC indicates the price of the criminal product, a is a labour-output coefficient, W
is the wage rate, and x indicates the profit extracted by the warlord or drug baron. Let us
say a quantitative restriction is placed on the sale of drugs taking the form of a domestic
supply restraint (VER). This will cause the price of C to rise, and result in positive
monopoly rents that are retained domestically.4 Note that I have omitted capital,
intermediate input and other costs of enforcement from (3). Their inclusion would only
complicate the algebra, and enforcement costs already enter via the DUP activities
captured in (1) above. If we assume that labour productivity (a) and wages are (W) are
constant, then these rents will be captured by warlords:
) 1 ( ) 1 ( x aW v P C + = + (4)
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4 I am assuming that the demand for C (for example addictive drugs) is highly inelastic.4
In the case of the tariff, it works on the demand side and the revenues are collected in
the North. It, therefore, constitutes a leakage from the domestic sector, and the
differentials in (5) with t instead of v need to be evaluated with a negative sign.
Utilising the information in (2) to (4), one may rewrite (2) as:
0 , 0 ) , ( 2 1 < > = f f vP tP f Y C C S  (6)
Equation 6 is the short-run aggregate supply function for the economy in the South. The
two arguments inside the function above represent tariff and VER revenues
respectively. The former has a positive impact on aggregate supply in the South, as it is
external, and actually diminishes DUP and other harmful externalities. It works on the
demand side. Nationals of the South residing in the North could capture some of these
tariff revenues. These monies could find their way back to the domestic economy via
money “laundering”. Laundering is a pure asset swap; it does not affect the total stock
of assets in the economy, but merely converts illegally obtained money into an existing
legally owned asset. By contrast, a VER is postulated to have negative supply-side
effects. It is a domestic quantitative restriction, which is a method of restricting C from
the supply side. It impacts negatively on total output because of the negative
externalities arising from crop eradication, corruption and law enforcement. In
principle, however, it does augment domestic demand or expenditure. Some of this will
be moderated by import leakage. Also, any positive aggregate demand effects hinge
crucially on income distribution. If warlords, who capture, this rent have a low
propensity to consume domestic goods then the aggregate demand effects will be
negligible. It is also worth noting that unlike with a VER, an import tariff on C,w h i c hi s
collected in the North, will have little impact on the South’s income distribution.
3 Macroeconomic effects of a VER and a transfer
Restrictions on the supply of the C sector in the South may have a welfare and
microeconomic motivation, but in turn it also has macroeconomic consequences. In the
macroeconomic context all income and expenditure is aggregated. In this section I also
analyse the macroeconomic effects of an income transfer or “aid” from North to the
South.
We begin by examining the goods market equilibrium condition in the North. This
requires aggregate supply or output to be equal to aggregate demand or expenditure.
Discrepancies between the two lead to adjustments in output, with output rising when
there is excess demand and vice versa (see Taylor, 1983; Murshed 1992a and 1992b).
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Here YN stands for aggregate supply or output in the North. On the right hand side we
have expenditure (EN) which is a function of disposable income (Y
D
N) plus exports (XN)
minus imports. There are two types of imports: ordinary imports are denoted by XS, and
criminal imports by C. Exports and imports are a function of disposable income and
relative prices (PS or the South’s price)). Note that we set the Northern price to unity,
and by appropriate choice of units set PS =P C. Although the C sector is subject to a
quantitative restriction, this has a price or tax equivalent in v. There are also VER rents5
arising from the consumption of C=v P SC that are “transferred” to the South (in actual
fact they remain there).
Disposable income in the North is given by:
) 1 ( t - = N N
D Y Y (8)
where ￿ is the tax on income, which is then given to the South in the form of aid.
Turning to goods market equilibrium in the South:
(.) (.) (.) ) ( ) , ( N S S S S
D
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YS is composed of the output of two sectors, S and C, where PS =P C. Note that YS1 =0
here, YS2<0 ,and disposable income (Y
D
S) is given by:
C vP Y Y Y S N S S
D + + = t (10)
It includes the transfer5 from the North and the rents from the supply restraint on C
which will both boost income and hence expenditure. But this expenditure might be
disproportionately directed towards imports or money laundering. In fact, laundering
does not add to domestic demand, as it involves changes in asset portfolios. Aggregate
excess demand in the South will cause output to increase in the model in this paper,
although it can be easily reconciled with a rise in the terms of trade, PS, Taylor (1983).
The details concerning the derivation of the model are contained in the appendix.
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The above expression cannot be signed unambiguously. Note that, ￿ =P SC2 <0 ,t h e
elasticity of C consumption with respect to price. I assume ￿ <1in absolute value. This
is in line with the fact that the consumption of C is highly price inelastic. The necessary
condition for the above expression to be negative is that YS1 >Cin absolute terms.
5 Although the transfer is mainly military aid, its macroeconomic effect is to increase aggregate
demand, albeit mainly on imports.6
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Again this expression cannot be signed unambiguously. The same necessary condition
applies for the above expression to be negative. An additional condition which will
reinforce the negative effects of the VER on equilibrium total output in the South is if
ES1 -0 . This means that the propensity to consume out of VER rents is very low. But it
does not imply that the overall propensity to consume is small, but rather we refer here
to consumption out of the rents generated by the VER. This could be low, particularly if
warlords who either launder their revenues or spend mainly abroad capture the rents.
The results above can be depicted in the diagram contained in Figure 1 in YN and YS
space. The NN schedule depicts equilibrium (aggregate demand equal to aggregate
supply) in the North’s goods market, and the SS schedule gives the same information for
the South. The NN is upward sloping (see A.3) because for given income in the South a
rise in income and expenditure in the North also benefits the South via the export
multiplier effect, causing income to rise in the South as well. A similar line of reasoning
applies to the upward sloping SS schedule (see A.4). The initial equilibrium is at point A
in Figure 1. The VER will cause both schedules to shift. There is a rightward movement
in the schedules if the effect on equilibrium income is expansionary; this is shown as
point C on the diagram. If, as is more likely, the VER causes a decline in equilibrium
income and output in both regions, the schedules shift leftwards and the new post-VER
equilibrium is at point D in Figure 1.
We know examine the impact of the transfer from North to South:
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The above expression is negative only if EN1 >X N1. It will, however, be positive if
EN1 <X N1. This means that if the marginal propensity to import in the South from the
North (XN1) is high the North’s income will increase after the transfer. This is due to the
positive export multiplier effect of the transfer for the North, particularly if such a gift
of aid is tied to the purchase of goods (weapons, say) and services from the North.
As far as the South is concerned:
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A sufficient condition for dYS/d￿ <0i s : . 0 1 1 1 < - - C X E S S The transfer is then “over-
effected”. The condition implies that the transfer does not boost expenditure on
domestic goods by much, instead increasing imports. Also, there is a reduction in the7
imports of the North from the South. Once again, the distribution of income and who
gets the transfer revenues matters. If the military complex and the elite capture aid, then
ES1 will be small and YS will decline. The North can gain at the expense of the South, or
at least the military complex in the North. Point D in Figure 1 illustrates such a new
equilibrium, where we omit the NN and SS schedules to avoid clutter.
While welfare is clearly related to matters such as income distribution, as an
approximation we can examine the impact of the VER-cum-transfer on the utility of a
“representative” consumer. In the South this will be synonymous with PSYS, as
alterations in income determine the capacity to consume. A fall in equilibrium income
lowers welfare of the representative consumer in the South. The VER will lower
aggregate supply in the South via the negative externalities associated with the domestic
supply restriction on the C good. Aggregate demand is also likely to decline,
particularly if those who receive VER rents do not consume domestic goods, and those
who capture the aid flows mainly import arms and security services from the donor
country. Furthermore, if we attach a low or negative value to the income of warlords
who capture VER rents, then there is an additional negative distributional effect of the
VER cum aid policy.
In the North, however, we examine the utility of the non-consumer of the C good. This
will take the form:
) ( C Y u U N - = . 0 1 > u (15)
In other words utility rises with the consumption of home and ordinary Southern goods
(both contained in changes in YN), and declines with the consumption of C. Evaluating
the above with respect to the two policy parameters will yield.
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Since the policies reduce C consumption, the second term on the right hand side of (16)
is positive. The effect on YN of the combined supply restraint and transfer is unclear.
Thus, the net effect on welfare is also ambiguous.
4 Macroeconomic effects of a tariff
We need to redefine the notions of disposable income, as in this case the revenues are
retained in the North. I postulate, however, that the revenues do not enter into the
income component in the demand function for the C good in the North. Also YS1 >0
applies and YS2 =0 . The definitions of disposable income become:
C tP Y Y S N N
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We substitute the two expressions above into equations (7) and (9), and also substitute t
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The necessary conditions for the tariff to have a positive impact on equilibrium output
in both regions, or for the expressions in (15) and (16) to be positive are:
i) EN1 >X S1. This means a stronger propensity to consume on home goods
relative to imports in the North. Note that with a tariff it is the North that gets
to keep and spend the tariff revenues.
ii) XN1YS1 >P SC(1+￿). This implies a substantial positive supply-side effect on
the South’s output following the tariff. It is worthwhile reminding ourselves
that the aggregate supply effect of the tariff is positive for the South, and is the
opposite of the effect with a domestic restriction on the C sector (VER).
iii) XS1C>C 2.
The results above are depicted by point C on the diagram. The reversal of the conditions
listed above are sufficient for the tariff to have a negative impact (point B in Figure 1).
The tariff, being similar to a tax on the consumption of C in the North, reduces its use in
the North directly. It actually raises aggregate supply in the South as DUP-type wasteful
activities and other harmful externalities are reduced. In the South, it does not lead to a
redistribution of income in favour of warlords or the military sector (no special aid or
transfer here). Aggregate demand and equilibrium income could also increase in both
regions. Welfare in the South increases. Evaluating (16) above with respect to the tariff
(t) tells us that the representative non-consumer of C will be unambiguously better off if
YN increases.
5 Conclusions
A tariff-equivalent is the first-best mode of control for the socially undesirable C good
consumed in the North and produced in the South. It has a direct impact on demand. It
could also increase income in both regions. It has a positive supply side effect in the
South and does not have the unfavourable income distribution effects of domestic
supply controls. The VER is, by contrast, a control mechanism working on the supply9
side of the C sector in the South. It creates undesirable rents that go to warlords, lowers
aggregate supply via negative externalities as well as DUP, and leads to unfavourable
alterations in income distribution. It could also diminish equilibrium output in both
regions. When a supply restraint is accompanied by a policy of aid, this could benefit
the donor (North) at the expense of the recipient (South), especially if the latter imports
a lot from the North. This is likely to be the case when the aid that accompanies the
destruction of coca crops mainly goes to the military and results in imported security
expenditure. The crucial hypothesis behind the results in the model rest with the nature
of the aggregate supply effects of the two output restraining instruments, as well as the
aggregate demand effects of aid.
The observant reader will have realised that the policy superiority of the tariff or tax
equivalent on consumption will increase if the illegality of drugs in the consuming
region is removed. But that is the point behind the dominance of a tax over a
quantitative restriction or prohibition. The former implies forcing consumers to pay
more for something that they are allowed to use. The latter is a regulation, which creates
the necessity for evasion, extortion and other shadowy underground activities. Revenues
from a tax can be better utilised in preventive and rehabilitation programmes. In the
producing region, legality will help eliminate the wasteful DUP type activities that
lower total output. It would also make it possible for the state to extract some of the
monopoly rents associated with production, which can then be used for fiscal
stabilisation and poverty alleviation.
Even if drugs continue to be illegal, a far superior policy-mix would include the taxation
equivalent on the demand side of the problem. On the supply side it would be better to
tackle the causes of increased drug production directly rather than simply destroy crops
and arm governments. The causes include internal conflict, falling commodity prices,
and state failure in social provisioning. Aid, which only goes to the military and not
poverty alleviation could ultimately have disastrous consequences, as it will intensify
existing civil wars. The rise in poverty, as well as the poverty-conflict nexus, is perhaps
the greatest cause of increased drug production at the primary stage.10
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Totally differentiating (7) and (9), utilising (8) and (10), arranging them in excess
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In the analysis above I have made the standard simplifying assumption that the initial
values v, ￿ and t=0 ;but dv, d￿,a n ddt ¹ 0. The various partial derivatives have the
following signs: EN1,E S1,X N1,X S1,C 1 >0 .C 2,Y S2 <0 . Note that, ￿ =P SC2 <0 ,the
elasticity of C consumption with respect to price. I assume ￿ <1in absolute value.
The trace of the Jacobian is negative. The determinant is given by:
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The model is therefore stable.
With the tariff the right hand side of (A.2) has an additional component:
dt
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The expression in (A.3) is greater in magnitude than (A.4); thus the NN schedule is
steeper than SS schedule.12
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